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Politicians’ moral behaviors affect how voters evaluate them. But existing empirical research on the effects of 
politicians’ violations of moral standards pays little attention to the heterogeneous moral foundations of voters 
in assessing responses to violations. It also pays little attention to the ways partisan preferences shape responses. 
We examine voters’ heterogeneous evaluative and emotional responses to presumably immoral behaviors by 
politicians. We make use of moral foundation theory’s argument that people vary in the extent to which they 
endorse, value, and use the five universally available moral intuitions: care, fairness, loyalty, authority and 
sanctity. We report on a 5 × 3 between-subjects experiment asking a random sample of 2,026 U.S. respondents 
to respond to politicians’ violations of different moral foundations. We randomly vary which of the five 
foundations is violated and the partisanship of the actor (Republic/Democrat/Nonpartisan). Results suggest that 
partisanship rather than moral foundations drives most of U.S. voters’ responses to moral foundations violations 
by politicians. These foundations seem malleable when partisan actors are involved. While Democrats in this 
sample show stronger negative emotional response to moral violations than Republicans, partisans of both 
parties express significantly greater negativity when a politician of the other party violates a moral foundation.
KEY WORDS: emotions, morality, scandals, values
Immoral behavior by politicians is nothing new. The candidacy and subsequent election of Donald 
Trump to the U.S. presidency seems to suggest that in the current American political environment, 
moral violations may be more rule than exception. During his campaign, Trump was accused of 
sexual misconduct as a tape surfaced where he talked about “grabbing them by the pussy,” while a 
number of women came forward accusing Trump of inappropriate and sexually harassing behaviors 
that in other times would have doomed his candidacy. Trump routinely verbally violated a wide 
range of moral norms during his campaign, for example, mocking a reporter for his disabilities and 
referring to a former Miss Universe contestant campaigning for Hillary Clinton as “Miss Piggy.” 
Even after the election, Trump continued to violate basic moral positions that might have sunk other 
presidents. Recently, Stormy Daniels, a pornographic movie star, alleged that she had had an affair 
with Trump and he paid her to cover it up just before the November 2016 vote. Unlike John Edwards, 
the 2008 Democratic presidential candidate whose campaign was doomed when an affair came to 
light, Trump continues with little obvious impact on his favorability ratings.
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Each of the above would be considered clear moral violations by moral foundation theorists, 
in particular, violations of the foundations of “care” and “sanctity” (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt 
& Graham, 2011). Among Trump’s most consistent supporters are religious conservative voters 
who generally perceive themselves as high in morality in everyday life, while identifying as strong 
Republicans when it comes to politics. This apparent conflict between moral values and partisan 
preferences suggests a need to examine the link between voters’ endorsements of moral foundations 
and their responses to moral transgressions of those foundations by politicians. If moral foundations 
are, in fact, innate and foundational, voter’s moral values should dominate when a foundation is vi-
olated. A voter who strongly cares about a particular moral foundation should react negatively to its 
violation, regardless of the party of the politician involved. And yet, as the Trump example makes 
clear, there is reason to question this belief. Over 90% of Republican voters supported Trump in 
2016, despite his continual violations of moral foundations, and presumably in opposition to their 
own support of those same foundations.
We wish to examine the extent to which underlying moral values subscribed to by American 
voters condition responses to violations of moral foundations by politicians. We consider whether 
the extent to which people care about moral foundations like care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and 
sanctity influences their negative emotional responses to violations. Alternatively, given the partisan 
nature of American politics in the early twenty-first century, it may be that partisan agreement is 
more important than moral foundations. We seek to answer the question of whether partisanship in 
America also extends to the point of overriding, or at least reducing, the effect of underlying moral 
values.
Partisanship is a core feature of the American political system. It acts as a perceptual screen 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960) coloring how partisans view all aspects of politics. 
More recent research on motivated reasoning (Lodge & Taber, 2013; Redlawsk, 2002; Taber & 
Lodge, 2006) provides a mechanism for this process, as existing affective evaluations—such as par-
tisan preference—influence the cognitive processing of relevant information. As a result, in an era 
of increasing partisan and social sorting, partisan preference may provide a great deal of cover for 
politicians who violate moral foundations. Mason (2018) documents how American social and polit-
ical identities have recently aligned so that previous crosscutting cleavages have all but disappeared. 
As a result, partisanship is now reinforced by other social identities, including religious identities. 
There may be good reason to think that moral foundations themselves can become subsumed within 
partisan identity, so that violations of foundations by the “other side” are much worse than violations 
by “our side.”
At the same time, studies have shown that exposure to scandals depresses voters’ candidate 
evaluations (Bhatti, Hansen, & Olsen, 2013; Carlson, Ganiel, & Hyde, 2000; Doherty et al., 2011) 
and reduces trust in political institutions and the political process (Bowler & Karp, 2004; Maier, 
2011). Politicians’ moral transgressions are extensively covered by the media (Fogarty, 2013). This 
does not appear to have changed in recent years; the allegations against Trump were certainly front 
and center in media reports during the 2016 presidential campaign. Moreover, following Trump’s 
election, allegations of sexual harassment against other powerful men in and out of politics spurred 
the #metoo movement, as women recounted their experiences. Former Sen. Al Franken, thought to 
be in the mix for the presidential campaign in 2020, was forced to resign, while others have also lost 
positions of power. Yet the very same kinds of claims against Trump did not, in the end, derail his 
candidacy, nor so far, his presidency.
Emotions play an important role in moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2003) and are key factors 
in voters’ moral judgments about politicians and institutions (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014; Bowler & Karp, 
2004). Emotions not only often guide moral judgments, but also shape voting behavior. Emotions 
have been found to underpin political campaigns generally (Marcus et al., 2000; Redlawsk, 2006) as 
voters both think and feel about politics. Negative emotions can be especially important. Among the 
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many aspects of politics that might trigger emotional responses, we would expect violations of moral 
foundations by politicians to be central, with voters expressing negative emotions about violators, but 
only to the extent that the voters themselves care about any given foundation that has been violated.
Despite the prominent role of emotions in explaining political behavior and numerous studies 
examining effects of politicians’ violations of moral standards, little attention has been paid to the 
intersection of the two, that is, how voters respond emotionally to politicians’ moral violations (the 
notable exceptions are Halmburger, Rothmund, Schulte, & Baumert, 2012 and Jiang et al., 2011). In 
addition, to our knowledge, no study has examined how heterogeneous preferences for moral foun-
dations condition how voters respond to politicians’ moral transgressions.
This study thus aims to answer three research questions: (1) How do American voters respond 
emotionally to violations of moral foundations by politicians? (2) Are voters’ emotional responses 
conditioned by their own moral values? and (3) Does partisanship influence the negative emotional 
responses voters have to violations of moral foundations? To examine these questions, we conducted 
a 5 × 3 between-subjects experiment with an online random sample of about 2,000 U.S. voters. We 
manipulated the moral foundation violated by a politician (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanc-
tity) and the partisanship of the politician involved (Republican, Democrat and no partisan label).
We find voters express negative emotional responses to politicians’ moral transgressions, but the 
level of negativity is strongly conditioned by partisanship. Democratic voters have stronger negative 
emotional responses to many of these moral violations than do Republicans. At the same time, par-
tisans of both parties express more negative emotions when a politician of the other party violates 
moral foundations, all else equal, while responding more similarly to a nonpartisan actor. Finally, 
while we anticipated that a voter who endorses the values of a particular foundation to a greater 
degree would be more negative when it is violated, this effect was and clearly less than the effects of 
party when partisan actors were involved.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, we discuss moral foundation theory 
and the role of emotions. Second, we summarize the literature explaining individual variance in 
response to politicians’ immoral behaviors and develop hypotheses from this literature. Third, the 
experimental design, analysis strategy, and operationalization of the variables are discussed. Finally, 
results are presented and conclusions are drawn.
Moral Violations and Emotions
We build on two strands of literature: the scandal literature from political science and literature 
on (moral) emotions and moral political judgements from social psychology. Moral judgment is the 
evaluation of an act as morally wrong or right (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014). Moral transgressions, that 
is, harm to others’ welfare, are thought to be inherently wrong since they have an intrinsic effect on 
the well-being of others (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014). Moral transgressions by politicians can become 
scandals, although the word “scandal” itself does not refer to the moral transgression, but to the 
communicative event surrounding the moral transgression becoming public (Lee, 2015).
Moral foundation theory (MFT) sees moral judgment as an intuitive process characterized by 
automatic affective reactions to stimuli (Clifford, Iyengar, Cabezzam, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015). 
This is in line with the social intuitionism model of morality (Haidt, 2001) which argues that people 
know intuitively whether acts are right or wrong. They are capable of swift judgment of an (im)moral 
act, but they take considerably more time to come up with a rationale when asked to explain their 
judgment (Haidt & Hersh, 2001). Haidt and Hersh (2001) argue that intuitions and emotions most 
often precede and guide moral emotions.
MFT categorizes moral intuitions into five foundations: care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and 
sanctity (Haidt & Graham, 2011). Care refers to the dislike for the suffering of others; fairness to a 
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commitment to fairness and justice. Loyalty is seen as a commitment to one’s own group. Authority 
refers to respect for authority and tradition, and sanctity refers to concerns with purity and con-
tamination. People differ in the extent to which they endorse these five values, and thus MFT also 
provides an understanding of moral diversity (Graham et al., 2011). MFT extends most scales used 
in moral psychology as it does not limit the moral domain to concerns about individuals harming 
or unfairly treating other individuals (Graham et al., 2011). Moreover, MFT is meant to cover the 
full range of moral concerns, including those found in non-Western cultures, in religious practices, 
and among political conservatives (Graham et al., 2011). Studies have found that political liberals 
and conservatives differ in the weight that they place on the various moral foundations (Graham 
et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). Specifically, liberals have been found to rate considerations of 
care and fairness as significantly more important moral values than loyalty, authority, or purity. To 
liberals, acts are perceived as immoral primarily to the extent that they harm others or treat people 
unfairly.
There appear to be only two studies that have examined people’s emotional responses to moral 
transgressions by politicians (Halmburger et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2011). Both studies report that ex-
posure to a political scandal generates negative emotions towards the politician involved. Halmburger 
et al. (2012) incorporates specific moral emotions in their study, reporting higher levels of anger and 
shame when subjects are exposed to a news report including a politician’s moral transgression. They 
also find that negative moral emotions stimulate need for retribution versus need for restoration of 
the moral transgressing politician (Halmburger et al., 2012). But these studies are of limited gen-
eralizability since they do not effectively account for the role partisanship plays in conditioning 
responses when partisan actors are involved.
Although moral foundation theory is a prominent theory, it is not uncontroversial. Various 
scholars criticize the assumptions underlying MFT, such as the innateness and stability of moral 
foundations (Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Martin, & Hatemi, 2017), the existence of five or six distinct 
moral foundations underlying moral judgment (Schein & Gray, 2018), and the strength and direction 
of the relationship between moral foundations and political predispositions (Ciuk, 2018; Smith et al., 
2017). Most recently, Connors (2019) reports that political values—like moral foundations thought 
by most scholars to be core beliefs—are readily influence by the social environment. Even with this, 
the theory is well enough established with key implications for politics that call for testing it in the 
political context we do here, following work by Clifford et al. (2015).
Heterogeneous Responses to Politicians’ Moral Transgressions
Moral transgressions by a politician should signal to voters that he or she is an immoral can-
didate, which should negatively affect the candidate’s electoral prospects. If it were that simple, 
we would have little to examine here: Voters would simply punish those who violate moral stan-
dards, with those feeling more strongly about a given moral foundation responding more negatively. 
However, politicians embroiled in scandals are not always electorally punished for their moral trans-
gressions, and individual voters’ responses to such transgressions differ in strength (Fernández-
Vázquez, Barberá, & Rivero, 2016). This has puzzled scholars and stimulated research trying to 
understand the psychology of the public’s heterogeneous reactions to scandals (e.g., Fischle, 2000; 
Halmburger et al., 2012; Lee, 2015).
Numerous factors are mentioned as potential sources for this variance in voters’ responses. 
Voters may respond differently to different types of scandals (Bhatti et al., 2013; Carlson et al., 2000; 
Doherty et al., 2011; Fernández-Vázquez et al., 2016). Thompson (2013) distinguishes three types of 
scandals, namely sex scandals, financial fraud scandals, and corruption scandals. Financial scandals 
are punished more severely than sex scandals (Brenton, 2011; Carlson et al., 2000, Funk, 1996), al-
though Doherty et al. (2011) notes this holds only as long as the sex scandal does not involve abuse 
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of power. The identity of the politician involved matters as does the politician’s response to the moral 
transgression (Lee, 2015; Tiedens, 2001). Gender appears related to voters’ judgments (Brenton, 
2011), but probably in combination with the type of scandal (Carlson et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2015).
Other research has shown that trait impressions and prior affect for the politician influence 
voters’ responses (Fischle, 2000; Funk, 1996). In judging a politician’s moral transgression, Funk 
(1996) argues that perceived competence matters more than perceived warmth, but only for the 
more politically knowledgeable voters (Funk, 1996). Recently, Laustsen and Bor (2017) have shown 
in an electoral context that warmth is the most influential candidate trait on which people judge 
politicians, perhaps challenging Funk. It also matters how credible voters perceive the information 
about a scandal—especially when there are claims that the politician committed the transgression 
intentionally (Anduiza, Gallego, & Munoz, 2013; Lee, 2015). The relevance and importance of the 
transgression also influences voters’ responses (Anduiza et al., 2013; Lee, 2015). These perceptions 
are also affected by how their news sources and the media in general frame the scandal (Peterson & 
Vonnahme, 2014; Shah, Watts, Domke, & Fan, 2002).
Finally, and especially relevant for our study, political identity in the form of partisanship may 
influence voters’ perceptions of politicians’ immoral behavior (Anduiza et al., 2013; Bhatti et al., 
2013; Blais et al., 2010; Fischle, 2000). Partisan preferences can engage motivated reasoning pro-
cesses that lead voters to discount or otherwise accept behavior from politicians who share those 
preferences, that they would not for politicians from another party (Kunda, 1990; Redlawsk, 2002). 
People selectively process information in ways that enable them to arrive at conclusions congruent 
and congenial to their prior beliefs, including political beliefs (Fischle, 2000). This process can 
readily lead to partisans rejecting information about immoral behavior by a copartisan politician as 
not credible. Even when they acknowledge the moral transgression, partisan voters might still bear a 
less negative judgment about their party’s candidate. While partisanship may not affect perceptions 
of the facts of the scandal, it may still affect political judgment (Blais et al., 2010).
The usual assumption is that partisan bias works both ways, so partisans perceive their own 
party more positively and other parties more negatively. However, Blais, Gidengil, and Kilibarda 
(2017) argue that the partisan effect is asymmetrical, although they note there has been little system-
atic investigation of how symmetric (or asymmetric) it might be. They find that partisans view their 
own parties as less corrupt than do nonpartisans, but they do not necessarily view other parties as 
more corrupt. Anduiza et al. (2013) also find an asymmetrical effect, arguing that moral transgres-
sions are judged differently by voters depending on whether the politician involved is a member of 
the respondent’s party, rival party, or of an unknown affiliation. However, not all studies find this 
partisan effect when it comes to how voters process politician’s moral violations (Halmburger et al., 
2012). Some find that political sophistication interacts with this partisan bias, and the partisan bias 
is absent among the more politically sophisticated.
Hypotheses
Considering the prominence that MFT has gained in social psychology, it seems surprising that 
political scientists have not used it yet to try to explain voters’ responses to moral violations by pol-
iticians. Certainly, moral violations occur, and voters historically have seemed to care about them, 
even if responses might be tempered for one’s own party. While there is evidence that partisans on 
different sides of the aisle see different moral foundations as salient (Haidt & Graham, 2011), exam-
ining all five foundations should let us get a better understanding of how voters respond to their vio-
lations and in particular, the extent of negative emotions generated by violations. Thus, the literature 
we have reviewed above leads us to propose the following four hypotheses:
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H1 (Partisanship and Negative Emotions Hypothesis): Across parties, respondents will have 
negative emotional responses to politicians committing moral violations, all else equal. But 
based on work by Haidt and Graham (2011), Democrats (typically liberals) will show stron-
ger negative emotions in response to violations of care and fairness specifically, compared to 
Republicans. Given no prior evidence of partisan effects, we do not have specific expectations 
about partisan responses to the other three foundations: loyalty, authority, and sanctity.
H2 (Moral Values Hypothesis): Negative emotional responses to violations of moral foundations 
by politicians will be conditioned on voters’ own endorsements of particular moral values. The 
more that respondents endorse a particular moral value, the stronger their negative emotional 
response will be when a politician violates that particular moral foundation.
H3 (Partisanship Interaction Hypothesis): Partisan respondents will be less negative about vi-
olations of moral foundations by politicians of their own party, compared to violations by out-
party and nonpartisan politicians committing the same violation.
H4 (Moral Values by Partisanship Interaction Hypothesis): Moral foundations are thought to 
be based on innate, evolutionarily developed intuitive ethics, where “moral judgment is caused 
by quick moral intuitions” (Haidt, 2001, p. 817). At the same time, in politics, we know that 
partisanship acts in many ways as a perceptual screen (Campbell et al., 1960), conditioning 
how voters respond to partisan information. Thus, when partisanship is not invoked in a moral 
foundation violation, we expect the strength of a given moral value to drive emotional response 
to it. However, when the actor is a partisan and so is the voter, we expect that partisan preference 
will moderate these effects.
This leads to a testable hypothesis: Respondents will express a lower level of negativity toward 
co-partisans violating a given foundation, compared to a nonpartisan or other party actor, at all lev-
els of moral values strength. That is, even though voters with stronger moral values should be more 
negative to violations of the corresponding moral foundation (H2), partisan-motivated reasoning 
should moderate these effects. However, for a nonpartisan actor, respondents who more strongly 
support a given moral value will be more negative about its violation than those for whom the value 
is less important.
Experimental Design
To examine voters’ emotional responses to moral violations by politicians, we conducted a 
between-subjects vignette experiment in a 5 (moral foundations) × 3 (levels of partisanship) design 
embedded in a survey of just over 2,000 U.S. voters. Using random assignment, we presented each 
participant with one of 15 pretested short vignettes describing a fictional, but realistic sounding 
scenario in which a politician’s behavior violated one of the five moral foundations. The vignette 
was preceded with a simple instruction: “We would like to have you consider an action of a poli-
tician that you might observe. Please read the statement and answer the questions that follow it.” 
We independently manipulated the moral foundation violated (care, fairness, loyalty, authority 
and sanctity) and the partisanship of the politician (Republican, Democrat, nonpartisan). The non-
partisan treatment allows us to estimate the effect of partisan labels on voters’ response to moral 
violation. Full details of the 15 conditions are shown in Table S2.1 in the online supporting in-
formation, while Section 3 of the online supporting information describes the stimuli seen by the 
study participants.
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The five vignettes used here were chosen from a pretest of 25 vignettes using a sample of 648 
U.S. respondents recruited through Amazon MTurk. Each vignette represents a violation of one of 
the five moral foundations. The original pool of 25 vignettes were developed by building on Clifford 
et al.’s (2015) standardized vignettes. Five vignettes were tested for each moral foundation. The 
vignettes chosen for this experiment best represented the moral foundations while also being per-
ceived by participants as understandable and realistic scenarios. The online supporting information 
provides a description of the pretest and the selection process of the stimulus material. The stimuli 
chosen for the experiment were perceived as correctly representing the intended moral foundation 
by the experiment’s participants; see Table S2.2 in the online supporting information for details. All 
vignettes were viewed as highly credible by the pretest sample, with 71% to 85% indicating they 
could very easily imagine the vignette as occurring.
The experimental study was conducted online using Qualtrics software. A sample of 2,026 re-
spondents living in the United States were surveyed through Survey Sampling International (SSI), a 
market research firm. The sample was recruited to closely match the adult population of the United 
States on age, gender, race/ethnicity, income, and region of residence, and successfully did so. Data 
were collected between August 11 and August 20, 2017. See Table S2.3 in the online supporting 
information for sample characteristics.
We presented each respondent with a single vignette and obtain comparability in our models by 
using statistical controls for subject characteristics in order to obtain unit homogeneity (King, 
Keohane, & Verba, 1994). This subsequently allows for analytical separation of the effect of each of 
the factors that define the vignettes on the evaluative responses of the respondent.1 By presenting 
respondents with a single vignette, we eliminate potential response effects of earlier presented stim-
uli on later stimuli. After the respondents were exposed to a vignette, we asked them to report the 
extent they experienced feelings of anger, anxiety, enthusiasm, pride, hope, shame, disgust, con-
tempt, admiration, sympathy, sadness, optimistic about humanity, warm-hearted and uplift, with the 
order randomized to minimize order effects. Finally, we gathered sociodemographic information 
and information on respondents’ own partisanship and support for the values that underlie the five 
moral foundations. Section 5 of the online supporting information presents the complete survey 
question wording and order.
Analytical Design
Although all 2,026 respondents were exposed to a vignette, we did not force respondents to 
answer all questions, and thus we have some missing values. For our analyses, then, we excluded 
those respondents that had a missing value on the dependent variables measuring emotion or on the 
independent variables included in our analyses, such as sociodemographic variables and moral val-
ues, leaving 1,918 cases for analysis. Randomization checks confirm that conditions were balanced 
on pretreatment covariates (see Table S2.4 in the online supporting information).
While we collected both positive and negative emotional responses to the vignettes, we focus 
here on negative emotions in order to understand the extent to which violations of moral founda-
tions repel voters. As we describe in detail below, we combined the set of six negative emotions for 
the purposes of this article to create a single negative-emotions scale. Accordingly, the dependent 
1On average, there is no need to include control variables in models estimating the effects of treatments on subjects who are 
randomly assigned to treatment groups. However, this is “on average,” which means that if we were to randomly assign an 
infinite number of respondents to these treatment groups, the distribution of characteristics in each condition would be 
perfectly equal. However, any particular study represents only one such attempt and is therefore subject to the vagaries of 
chance. The smaller the number of subjects and the larger the number of conditions the more likely it is that the groups 
exposed to different conditions differ in terms of their composition. For example, there are differences in gender across our 
conditions. Therefore, it is a safe strategy to include relevant characteristics in the model. We also ran the models without 
controls and found no significant difference in results.
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variable has a range of 0 to 30 and thus allows us to make use of simple ordinary least-squares re-
gression models. The large number of observations in our sample lets us test for main effects and 
key interactions to test our hypotheses. Because we have three-way interactions in our model, we 
will present the higher-order interactions using predicted values showing the net differences in the 
negative-emotions scale of exposure to each vignette compared to the baseline, by partisanship and 
moral values.
Variable Operationalization
We asked respondents about the standard nonmoral negative emotions that are part of most 
studies on emotions (anxiety and sadness) and added a subset of negative moral emotions drawn 
from Haidt (2003); contempt, anger, shame, and disgust. While not used in this article, we also asked 
about positive emotions—hope, enthusiasm, admiration, and three indicators of “elevation” (Algoe 
& Haidt, 2009)—warm-hearted, optimistic about humanity, and uplift.
All emotions are measured as ordinal variables on a 5-point scale, where 0 is “not at all” and 
4 is “extremely.” Table S2.5 in the online supporting information reports the correlations between 
the emotions, while Tables S2.6 and S2.7 report the result of a Mokken (1971) scale analysis of 
both positive and negative emotions. The analysis shows the emotions are indices of two underlying 
dimensions, namely positive and negative affect, with homogeneity coefficients indicating strong 
scales, respectively, 0.56 and 0.68. While each specific negative emotion may have differential re-
sponses, for our purposes the focus here is on negative affect more generally. Disentangling each 
emotion may provide detail, but it does so at the cost of multiple complex models that do not increase 
our basic understanding of how moral transgressions influence negative emotions about candidates. 
Thus, we collapse all of the negative emotions into a single scale for the analyses in this article.
To measure participants’ own support for moral values, we use the most prominent instrument, 
Graham et al.’s (2011) Moral Foundations Questionnaire. This questionnaire measures the degree to 
which individuals endorse each of the five intuitive systems posited by the moral foundations theory 
(MFT). The Moral Foundation Questionnaire contains 30 items in two parts. In the first part, par-
ticipants rate how relevant each of the 15 concerns are to them when making moral judgments. In the 
second part, participants rate their agreements with statements that embody or negate each founda-
tion (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). The resulting scale covering the full range of 
human moral concerns is found to be reliable and valid (Graham et al., 2011). For the analyses, we 
make use of the subscales of the moral foundations that were measured with six items each, the 
scores run between 0 and 5.2 The Cronbach alpha’s of the subscales care, fair, loyalty, authority, and 
sanctity are respectively, 0.72, 0.68, 0.72, 0.69, and 0.79. We use the results of the moral values as-
sessment to examine how the level of endorsement of a particular value influences the response to 
the violation of the underlying foundation.3
Partisanship is measured using a typical 7-point scale, constructed from a series of questions 
that first ask whether the respondent is a Democrat, Republican, or Independent and then asks the 
2See http://www.moralfoundations.org/questionnaires for how to combine the scores on the questions to come to the 
subscales.
3New work by Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres (2018) has highlighted potential biasing effects of measuring moderating 
variables posttreatment in an experimental design, as we have done here. Measuring moral values and partisanship could 
not be done before treatment, given the very real risk that doing so would prime participants in their responses to the moral 
foundations vignette, which implicated moral values and in some cases the partisanship of the actor. However, this does not 
mean that our results are biased, per se. For a treatment effect to be present, the treatment, the dependent variable, and 
moderators need to share variance. We have examined the shared variance between these variables and find only weak re-
lationships between these variables. In particular, the shared variance between the treatment indicators and the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire are negligible, with none higher than r2 = .0025; none are statistically significant. Results of this 
analysis are available upon request from the first author.
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strength of the party preference, or for independents, whether the respondent leans one way or the 
other. In the analyses to come, however, we do not differentiate by strength of party, creating dummy 
variables representing Republicans, Democrats, and Independents.
Results
Do U.S. voters evidence negative emotional responses to politician’s immoral behavior? We 
begin by examining the responses across all of our participants to each of our moral values vignettes. 
We focus here on initial models testing our first two hypotheses: that violations of moral foundations 
differentially generate negative emotions for Democrats versus Republicans and that these negative 
emotions are greater when the underlying moral foundation that is violated is one about which voters 
feel strongly.4
Table 1 presents the partisan and interaction coefficients from a series of OLS models predicting 
our negative emotions scale. The models include a set of control variables not reported in the table 
(full models can be found in Table S1.1 in the online supporting information). Each model is defined 
by the interaction between a vignette and its associated moral value while including responses to all 
other vignettes and preferences on all other moral values. Table 1 ignores the partisan manipulation 
to examine Hypothesis 1: Do moral values expressed by voters and the moral violations presented in 
the vignettes generate negative responses as would be expected by MFT?
We begin by looking at differences between Republicans and Democrats in our sample. Recall 
that Hypothesis 1 expects Democrats to express greater negative emotion than Republicans on the 
foundations of care and fairness, while anticipating that Republicans will weaker negative responses 
(compared to independent voters as the baseline). We did not anticipate any partisan effect for loy-
alty, authority, and sanctity. However, we find that in all models, Democrats express higher levels 
of negative emotion than Republicans and Independents to violations of all moral foundations. In 
general, Republicans react significantly less negatively than Democrats and are indistinguishable 
from independents on this set of vignettes, all else equal. Thus, we partially see the effect anticipated 
by our first hypothesis, where Democrats are more negatively influenced by violations of care and 
fairness, while Republicans are not. But in these data, the GOP respondents are also less likely to be 
negative about the other three foundations, compared to Democrats, an unexpected result.
We turn next to the effects of the vignettes themselves and the underlying moral values each 
represents. Here we focus on the interaction term for each model, which describes the added effect 
of viewing a moral value vignette on negative emotional response, conditioned on support for the 
moral value in question (see Table S1.1 in the online supporting information for main effects). We 
find that for three of the moral values—care, authority, and sanctity—the effect of viewing the asso-
ciated vignette significantly increases negative emotional responses when the respondent cares more 
about that foundation.5 No such evidence is found for the other two values, loyalty and fairness. In 
fact, the coefficient of the interaction for fairness is negative, although not significant. Thus, we find 
only partial evidence for our Hypothesis 2 (Moral Foundations Hypothesis), that a stronger commit-
ment to a moral value leads to a stronger negative emotional response when one sees that particular 
moral foundation violated.
4Table S2.3 in the online supporting information describes the sample demographics while Table S2.2 describes the mar-
ginal responses to each of the five vignettes, for all three levels of partisanship.
5One anonymous reviewer suggested that our analyses controlling for partisanship may be unfair to moral values in hiding 
their true effects. In order to test this, we reestimated the model in Table 1 without the partisan-control variable, but retain-
ing all other controls. In the revised model, the coefficients for the moral values remain virtually unchanged. There are no 
significant differences between the coefficients with and without partisan controls. This analysis is available on request 
from the first author, and we thank the reviewer for suggesting this test.
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11Voters’ Partisan Responses to Politicians’ Immoral Behavior
Our third hypothesis tests the proposition that violations of moral foundations elicit less nega-
tive emotion when they are committed by a copartisan than when they are committed by a member 
of the other party or nonpartisan actor. We expect to see the equivalent for Republicans. However, 
we might temper this expectation given our earlier finding that Democrats express stronger negative 
emotions to moral foundation violations than do Republicans and Independents, across all of the 
values and partisan actors. Thus, it is possible that Democrats will give less leeway even to their own 
party than Republicans give to theirs.
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of a series of models testing Hypothesis 3 by examining the 
partisan nature of the vignettes without differentiating the moral foundations involved. Models 1 and 
2 in Table 2 show the effects when the respondent and the candidate guilty of the moral transgression 
are from the same party, using the nonpartisan vignette as the baseline. Our primary interest is the 
interaction between the partisan nature of the vignette and the respondent’s party. We find for both 
sets of partisans, knowing that a politician of the same party committed the moral transgression goes 
a long way toward reducing negative responses, as shown by the significant and substantive negative 
coefficients. However, summarized across all five moral values, the effects for Democrats are not 
much smaller than for Republicans; Democrats may show some greater negative emotion towards 
the specific moral transgressions (Table 1), but they are nearly as mollified when the perpetrator is 
a fellow Democrat as Republicans are when the transgression is committed by a GOP politician.
Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 display the effects when the moral transgression is committed by a 
politician from the opposite party. Now we see, as expected, that negative emotions are greatly en-
hanced, exactly the partisan effect we would expect. Here, Democrats seem more condemning than 
Republicans, showing a significantly larger negative effect in the interaction term. The remaining 
models, displayed in Table 3, reinforce the partisan nature of these effects. These represent the cases 
of either nonpartisan voters or nonpartisan vignettes. In all of these models (Models 5–9), we see no 
interaction effect for partisanship of voter by partisanship of vignette. Overall, these data suggest we 
cannot reject Hypothesis 3, the Partisanship Interaction Hypothesis.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 tests whether partisanship moderates the effects of the strength of support 
for a particular moral value. That is, we anticipate a three-way interaction between the partisanship 
of the voter, of the political actor, and the extent to which the voter endorses a moral value, such that 
the increasing negativity that comes from endorsing a moral value and seeing it violated is reduced 
when a copartisan politician is the one doing the violating.
For purposes of interpretation, we do not present the detailed regression models with higher 
order interactions here, but we focus on a set of figures drawn from the full models available in 
Tables S1.3 through S1.8 of the online supporting information, each of which examines one of the 
foundations with the last examining the nonpartisan vignettes. Because of our experimental design, 
we do not have a nonmoral foundations, nonpartisan baseline. Thus our analyses compares each 
moral foundation to the average of the other four foundations, which serves as the baseline. This, 
plus the fact that the moral foundations themselves vary in their intensity and effects on respondents, 
means that our analysis focuses within each moral foundation, not across foundations. That is, we 
are not comparing foundations to each other, but instead the partisan and personal moral values ef-
fects within foundations. Our hypothesis does not suggest that one foundation has stronger or weaker 
effects than another, and so we do not address this question.
Each figure displays the mean predicted negative emotions score from exposure to a given 
moral foundation vignette minus the baseline negative emotions score for those exposed to the other 
vignettes. Thus, we chart the net increase in negative emotions from exposure to a specific moral 
foundation violation compared to the average of the other four vignettes. A positive value signals that 
exposure to the specific vignette increased negative emotions, and a negative value means it de-
creased negative emotions. The lines at the top of each bar are the 95% confidence intervals of the 
means. The size of the effect can theoretically run from − 30 to + 30; in practice it is much more 
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constrained.6 The result of interest is not so much the absolute size of any effect, but instead the 
relative differences in the effects of partisanship and moral values. In these analyses, we examine 
key effects: in-party versus nonpartisan and out-party actors and the effects of personal strength of 
the referenced moral value. If moral foundations are basic orientations to values, we should see the 
effects of the individual’s adoption of a foundational value to be stronger than the effects of party.
Turning to Figure 1, we see a clear in-party/out-party effect. Republican and Democratic voters 
both express greater negative reactions when exposed to a politician of the other party violating the 
foundation care, compared to a politician of their own party, regardless of the extent to which they 
value the care foundation. We also find that Democratic and Republican participants are equally 
negative when the other party candidate violated care, but Democrats are much more negative to-
ward their own politician’s violation than Republicans are towards theirs. Republicans respond with 
more equanimity than Democrats to the care vignette when their own politician violates it. For both 
party’s voters, the nonpartisan vignette effects are somewhere between the effects for partisan ac-
tors, as we would expect.7
We also find that all of the effects of violating the moral foundation of care are stronger for 
those participants for whom that particular moral value is stronger, compared to those for whom it 
is less important. Generally, respondents who emphasize care, that is, have a higher score on that 
value, generally express more negative emotions when the care foundation is violated, whether or 
not the politician is a member of their party. This effect is made very clear when examining high 
and low care results for nonpartisan vignettes. When partisanship is removed, the effects of personal 
values are much clearer. High-care Republicans are 2.0 points more negative than low-care voters, 
compared to 1.47 and 1.02 points for GOP and Democratic actors, respectively. For Democrats, the 
difference is even greater, with high-care voters 2.95 points more negative than low-care voters 
versus 1.22 and 1.62 points for GOP and Democratic politicians. When viewing a partisan vignette 
about the care foundation, voters are particularly negative about the other party, compared to their 
own, and the strength of their personal care value is much less important.
Figure 2 displays the net difference of exposure to violations of the foundation fairness. Again 
we see a clear partisan effect. Both Republican and Democratic respondents express additional neg-
ative feelings relative to the baseline when exposed to an out-party politician violating fairness. At 
the same time, both groups of respondents do not become more negative when their own party pol-
itician violates fairness. For Republican respondents, exposure to a violation by their own politician 
appears to reduce their negative emotions. But, unlike care, we do not find a foundation effect for 
fairness for Democrats. It does not matter how Democratic respondents score on the fairness value 
for how they respond to a politician’s violation of that foundation, even when the politician is not pre-
sented as partisan. But for Republican respondents we see a curious effect: Scoring high on fairness 
reduces the negativity associated with either party politician violating it although the effect does not 
occur when partisanship is not included in the vignette. As with care, the effects of partisanship on 
fairness are much larger (a maximum of 4.17 points comparing the high-fairness GOP voter faced 
with a GOP politician to one faced with the Democratic politician) than the effects of the moral 
value score (maximum of 1.42 points for a GOP voter learning about a Democratic politician.).
Turning to loyalty, we again find that partisanship plays the more important role, as is seen 
in Figure 3. Again it is the case that both Democrats and Republicans have more negative feelings 
6In theory, the baseline emotional response to a vignette could be as high as +30 (all negative emotions felt at the extreme 
level) or 0, all negative emotions felt not at all. If the baseline were at the extreme in either case, and the specific vignette 
were felt at the opposite extreme, the scores would be either +30 (vignette felt a the positive extreme, baseline at 0) or −30 
(vignette at 0 and baseline at 30.) In practice, the actual results are constrained between +7 and −5 across all five 
vignettes.
7We thank the anonymous reviewer who suggested we examine the nonpartisan vignettes more closely than we had origi-
nally done. The differences between partisan and nonpartisan vignettes help strengthen our case.
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Figure 1. Net negative emotions score: exposure to violation of care. Predicted values from Tables A1.3 and A1.8. Bars 
represent the mean net Negative Emotion Score comparing exposure to the vignette to the average score across all non-
exposed respondents. Lines represent the 95% CI around the means. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
Figure 2. Net negative emotions after exposure to violation of fairness. Predicted values from Tables A1.4 and A1.8. Bars 
represent the mean net Negative Emotion Score comparing exposure to the vignette to the average score across all non-
exposed respondents. Lines represent the 95% CI around the means. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
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about an out-party candidate violating loyalty than an in-party candidate. For GOP voters feelings 
about a nonpartisan politician are somewhere in between. Their negative feelings in comparison to 
the baseline do not increase when their own candidate commits a moral transgression, and in fact 
the Republicans are less negative compared to the baseline. We do not find a foundation effect; the 
extent to which respondents care about the foundation loyalty does not significantly affect their feel-
ings when this foundation is violated.
Figure 4 shows the net difference of exposure to a violations of the foundation authority. We 
see a clear negative vignette effect. Exposure to these vignettes resulted in fewer negative emo-
tions compared to the baseline average across all other vignettes. Given that we are not comparing 
across vignettes in this way, the result is interesting, but probably reflects differing strengths of the 
vignettes themselves. More importantly, we find no effects for partisanship in the violation of this 
foundation: Democratic and Republican voters respond similarly across all vignette actors. We do, 
however, see some effects of the strength of the moral value for authority. In general, scoring higher 
on the authority values results in increased negative emotions on seeing it violated. However, the 
difference is largest (and significant) for the nonpartisan vignette, where there are no partisan cues. 
For Democrats only the increased negativity is also significant for their own party candidate, but 
it is not significant for the GOP candidate, nor is it significant for either candidate for Republican 
voters. When partisanship is in the mix, the effects of the strength of the authority value are more 
limited.
When examining the effects of politicians’ violating the moral foundation sanctity, we once 
more find a strong partisan effect and virtually no effect of strength of the sanctity moral value. 
Figure 3. Net negative emotions score: exposure to violation of loyalty. Predicted values from Tables A1.5 and A1.8. Bars 
represent the mean net Negative Emotion Score comparing exposure to the vignette to the average score across all non-
exposed respondents. Lines represent the 95% CI around the means. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
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Republican and Democratic respondents experience more negative feelings when exposed to a 
moral transgression of an out-party candidate versus an in-party candidate. The effect is stronger for 
Republicans than Democrats. However, as with authority, when partisanship is not a factor, voters 
who care more strongly about the sanctity value are much more negative about its violation. This is 
true for both Republicans and Democrats in our study.
In order to make these results even more clear, we turn to Table 4, where we show the predicted 
mean differences in the negative emotion scores comparing voters who are high on a moral value to 
those low on the value (first section of Table 4) and comparing Republicans to Democrats (second 
section.) Table 4 thus summarizes the comparisons we drew from Figures 1‒5 and shows which 
differences are statistically significant at p < .01. The table reinforces the narrative from the figures: 
For the most part, partisanship has greater effects on negative emotions than does the strength of 
preference for a particular value. Only for our authority vignette does partisanship show no effects. 
Of the nine significant effects for strength of the moral value (out of 30 tests), two-thirds occur when 
the actor is not a partisan Democrat or Republican. Only three of the 20 tests for partisan actors are 
significant.
Taken together, these figures and Table 4, drawn from underlying interaction models, show that 
when taking into account the strength which participants attach to moral values and the partisanship 
of an actor violating moral foundations, partisanship usually shows significantly greater effects in 
Figure 4. Net negative emotions score: exposure to violation of authority. Predicted values from Tables A1.6 and A1.8. Bars 
represent the mean net Negative Emotion Score comparing exposure to the vignette to the average score across all non-
exposed respondents. Lines represent the 95% CI around the means. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
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Figure 5. Net Negative emotions score: exposure to violation of sanctity. Predicted values from Tables A1.7 and A1.8. Bars 
represent the mean net Negative Emotion Score comparing exposure to the vignette to the average score across all non-
exposed respondents. Lines represent the 95% CI around the means. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
Table 4. Predicted Mean Net Negative Emotion Scores: Exposure to Vignette Minus Nonexposure
Care Fairness Loyalty Authority Sanctity
Net Negative Emotions: Low on Moral Value vs. High on Moral Value
Republican Voter
Republican Politician 1.47* −1.3* 0.04 1.23 −0.12
Nonpartisan Politician 2.00* 0.18 −0.29 1.96* 3.53*
Democratic Politician 1.02 −1.42* 0.27 1.44 −0.1
Democratic Voter
Republican Politician 1.22 −0.22 −0.35 0.42 −.04
Nonpartisan Politician 2.95* −0.53 0.54 1.50* 2.17*
Democratic Politician 1.62* 0.28 0.17 1.36 −0.52
Net Negative Emotion: Republican Voter vs. Democratic Voter
Low on Moral Value
Republican Politician −6.42* −6.41* −3.9* −.45 −3.41*
Nonpartisan Politician −2.55* 0.25 −1.58* .38 1.55
Democratic Politician 3.38* 3.36* 4.41* .01 2.6*
High on Moral Value
Republican Politician −6.17* −7.49* −3.51* .36 −3.49*
Nonpartisan Politician −3.5* 0.96 −2.41* .84 2.91*
Democratic Politician 2.78* 1.66* 4.51* .09 3.02*
Note. Predicted values from Tables S1.3 through S1.8 in the online supporting information. Cells are difference in means 
for those respondents exposed to a vignette compared to the baseline of all other respondents not exposed to the vignette.
*Significant difference, p < .01, t-test.
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generating negative emotions in response to violations across four of the five moral foundations. We 
thus find evidence suggesting that we cannot reject our fourth hypothesis.8
Discussion and Conclusions
This study set out to answer three questions, namely (1) How do American voters respond 
emotionally to violations of moral foundations by politicians? (2) Are voters’ emotional responses 
conditioned by their own moral values? and (3) Does partisanship minimize the effects of violations 
of moral foundations by politicians of the voter’s own party compared to the other party? We find 
that in general voters respond with negative emotions to politicians’ moral violations. However, not 
all voters respond in the same manner; we find that Democrats tend to respond more negatively to 
this set of moral violations than do Republicans. We might speculate that the political environment 
in which our study was done could have played a role in this unexpected result. As we detailed at the 
beginning of the article, there have been many accusations of moral violations by President Trump, 
none of which seem to shake his core Republican supporters. One impact of this may have been to 
lessen Republican voters’ sensitivity to moral violations by politicians more generally. Unfortunately, 
we have no way to test this speculation. We do find that voters’ responses to these moral violations 
can be sometimes conditioned by their own moral values, but they are more so by their partisanship 
when partisan actors are involved. Partisans of both parties express more negative emotions when a 
politician of the other party violates moral foundations.
While we do not have a direct test of the mechanism by which partisanship conditions the 
effects of moral violations on emotional responses to politicians, a lengthy literature on partisan-
ship in American politics makes clear that partisans see the political world through a very specific 
perceptual screen (Campbell et al., 1960). Motivated reasoning (Lodge & Taber, 2013; Redlawsk, 
2002) likely becomes engaged when a voter sees a copartisan politician violating a moral founda-
tion, leading to biased processing of the event, and the reduction of negativity about the event. But 
when the other party commits the violation, partisans are more than willing to express negative 
emotions about the event. Brain imaging studies reinforce the potential of this mechanism as distinct 
differences are seen between Democrats and Republicans in their processing of political information 
(Schreiber et al., 2013). Note that while we started this article with a brief discussion about moral 
violations by U.S. President Trump and his seeming imperviousness to them, it is worth recalling 
that it is generally only his Republican supporters who accept his behavior.
This study contributes to the literature in various ways. First of all, it is among a handful stud-
ies (Halmburger et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2011) to study emotional responses to moral violations. A 
follow-up study will examine the specific negative emotions to see whether these moral violations 
evoke specific discrete emotions, in particular so-called moral emotions (Haidt, 2003). However, our 
main interest here is to see how partisanship and the importance of moral values for the voter affect 
emotional responses more generally.
Second, this study is the first to assess the role of voters’ moral values in their response to moral 
transgressions, as the results show they do matter. However, partisanship, more often than not, over-
rides the effects of moral values. This is a very interesting finding and suggests that moral founda-
tions are maybe not as innate and foundational as might be supposed (see also, Connors [2019] on 
political values). The partisanship effect in this study is asymmetrical, showing that voters judge the 
8An anonymous reviewer raised the question of the causal relationship in our model, asking to what extent the effect of the 
control variables partisanship and voters’ own moral values might have a mediating instead of a moderating effect on voters’ 
emotional response to politicians’ moral violations. We have examined this by estimating the potential mediating effects 
with block recursive regression modelling. The difference between the coefficients of the models with and without mediator 
is not significant and negligible, suggesting that a moderation analysis is appropriate. We thank the reviewer for suggesting 
this analysis. Details are available from the first author on request.
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opposing candidate more harshly for moral transgressions than their own candidate. This is in line 
with the trend of negative partisanship in American politics (Mason, 2018). Research has shown that 
while the feelings Democrats and Republicans have about their own party have not changed, their 
feelings about the opposing party have become much more negative (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016).
As with any research, this study is not without its shortcomings, one being the time frame in 
which it was conducted, namely following the 2016 presidential elections, which led to the election 
of a politician with frequent moral transgressions. It is not unthinkable that in a different time period 
we might find differences with respect to the strength of partisan responses to violations of moral 
foundations. Thus, we must consider that aspect of our results to be conditional, warranting further 
study in a different context.
Another limitation is that the vignettes used were specific. That is, the politician referred to 
in a vignette took a specific action. There is probably heterogeneity in people’s responses to these 
actions, and by the necessity of the research design, each study participant saw only one action rep-
resenting one moral foundation. It is possible, for example, that a different vignette representing the 
same foundation might have a different impact on participants’ emotions. However, we are less in-
terested here in the specific reactions to specific vignettes than we are in the larger story, that moral 
foundations appear to be readily ignored in the face of partisan actors. Across all of the vignettes we 
use, partisan voters were far less negative about a same-party actor violating a foundation than they 
were an opposite-party actor. At the same time, although extensively pretested, the authority vignette 
had the lowest homogeneity coefficient and resulted in the weakest findings. Apparently American 
voters did not find that specific example to be compelling.
Finally, as described in Footnote 2, new research by Montgomery et al. (2018) suggests that 
appropriate care must be taken in measuring moderating variables in an experimental context. 
We were concerned that measuring our moderators—partisanship and moral values—before the 
experimental treatment would prime participants as to the purpose of our study and thus influence 
their responses to the treatment. Thus, we measured them at the end of the study. While the very 
small shared variance we report between the moderators and treatment provides some confidence 
that our results are not biased, future studies should consider ways to separate these measures, 
such as the use of multiple waves. If the work by Montgomery et al. (2018) is sustained through 
additional research, experimentalists in general will need to consider whether the potential costs 
of such strategies outweigh the risks of biasing results by measuring moderators after an experi-
mental treatment.
While recognizing the potential bias suggested by Montgomery et al. (2018) may be present in 
our analyses, notwithstanding the very small shared variance between our measures, any such bias 
would matter more if we were making inferences about the direct effects of specific coefficients 
in our models. But, instead, we are more interested in the patterns that we see in the data when 
different moral foundations are engaged across partisan voters. To the extent that these patterns 
of differential response by partisan voters and those who more or less adopt the moral values of 
the foundation are biased, we would not expect the bias to eliminate the differences we see across 
groups. Thus, while the effects of any given treatment may be more or less than we find here, we 
expect any bias would be unidirectional across the treatments, and thus the patterns we find would 
remain.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study makes a significant contribution to the moral 
foundations literature. For the first time, we examine the intersection of partisanship and moral 
foundations and find that, as with so many other things in American politics in the early twen-
ty-first century, responses to moral violations by politicians are subject to partisan preferences. 
This holds even when voters themselves feel strongly about a given moral foundation. Put sim-
ply, when the effects of partisanship and strength of support for moral values are tested against 
each other in predicting emotional responses to violations of moral foundations, partisanship 
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usually comes out the winner. This provides new insight into the role of moral violations in 
politics and helps us understand perhaps why some American politicians are able to continue to 
receive strong support from their own party voters even after violating what are thought to be 
basic moral values.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Research presented in this article has been funded with a Nottingham Research Fellowship 
of the University of Nottingham. We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers, participants 
of the 2017 APSA Morality Panel and the 2018 MPSA Political Norms and Values Panel for 
their helpful comments and suggestions to improve this article. In particular, we would like to 
thank Cees van der Eijk for his methodological support throughout this project. Correspondence 
concerning this article should be addressed to Annemarie S. Walter, School of Politics and 
International Relations, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, United Kingdom. Email: Annemarie.Walter@
nottingham.ac.uk
REFERENCES
Abramowitz, A. I., & Webster, S. (2016). The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st 
century. Electoral Studies, 41, 12–22.
Algoe, S. B., & Haidt, J. (2009). Witnessing excellence in action: The “other-praising” emotions of elevation, gratitude and 
admiration. Journal of Positive Psychology, 4, 105–127.
Anduiza, E., Gallego, A., & Munoz, J. (2013). Turning a blind eye: Experimental evidence of Partisan bias in attitudes toward 
corruption. Comparative Political Studies, 46, 1664–1692.
Ben-Nun Bloom, P. (2014). Disgust, harm and morality in politics. Political Psychology, 35, 495–513.
Bhatti, Y., Hansen, K. M., & Olsen, A. L. (2013). Political hypocrisy: The effect of political scandals on candidate evaluation. 
Acta Politica, 48, 408–428.
Blais, A., Gidengil, E., Fournier, P., Nevitte, N., Everitt, J., & Kim, J. (2010). Political judgments, perceptions of facts, and 
partisan effects. Electoral Studies, 29, 1–12.
Blais, A., Gidengil, E., & Kilibarda, A. (2017). Partisanship, information and perceptions of government corruption. 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 29, 95–110.
Bowler, S., & Karp, J. A. (2004). Politicians, scandals and trust in government. Political Behaviour, 26, 271–187.
Brenton, S. (2011). When the personal becomes political: Mitigating damage following scandals. Current Research in Social 
Psychology, 18, 1–13.
Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, P. E. (1960). The American voter. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press.
Carlson, J., Ganiel, G., & Hyde, M. S. (2000). Scandal and political image. Southeastern Political Review, 28, 747–757.
Clifford, S., Iyengar, V., Cabezzam, R., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2015). Moral foundation vignettes: A standardized stimulus 
database of scenarios based on moral foundations theory. Behavioral Research Methods, 47, 1178–1198.
Ciuk, D. J. (2018). Assessing the contextual stability of moral foundations: Evidence from a survey experiment. Research & 
Politics, 1–9.
Connors, E. C. (2019). The social dimension of political values. Political Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09530-3
Doherty, D., Dowling, C., & Miller, M. (2011). Are financial or moral scandals worse? It depends. PS: Political Science & 
Politics, 44(3), 749–757.
Fernández-Vázquez, P., Barberá, P., & Rivero, G. (2016). Rooting out corruption or rooting for corruption? The heterogeneous 
electoral consequences of scandals. Political Science Research and Methods, 4, 379–397.
Fischle, M. (2000). Mass response to the Lewinsky scandal: Motivated reasoning or Bayesian updating? Political Psychology, 
21, 135–159.
Fogarty, B. J. (2013). Scandals, news coverage, and the 2006 congressional elections. Political Communication, 30, 419–433.
Funk, C. L. (1996). The impact of scandal on candidate evaluations: An experimental test of the role of candidate trait. 
Political Behavior, 18, 1–24.
22 Walter and Redlawsk
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(5), 1029–1046.
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 366–385.
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgement. Psychological 
Review, 108, 814–834.
Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidon, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective sci-
ences (pp. 852–870). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not 
recognize. Social Justice Research, 20, 98–116.
Haidt, J., & Hersh, M. A. (2001). Sexual morality: The cultures and emotions of conservatives and liberals. Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology, 21, 191–221.
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2011). Mapping moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 366–385.
Halmburger, A., Rothmund, T., Schulte, M., & Baumert, A. (2012). Psychological reactions to political scandals: Effects on 
emotions, trust, and need for punishment. Journal of Political Psychology, 2, 30–51.
Jiang, J., Kou, Y., Wang, F., Wu, Y., Li, Y., Li, Y., … Wang, X. (2011). Emotional reactions to scandals: When does moral 
character make a difference? Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 207–216.
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry. Princeton: Princeton: University Press.
Koleva, S., Graham, P. J., Iyer, R., Ditto, P. H., & Haidt, J. (2012). Tracing the threads: How five moral concerns (especially 
Purity) help explain culture war attitudes. Journal of Research in Personality, 46, 184–194.
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 480–498.
Laustsen, L., & Bor, A. (2017). The relative weight of character traits in political candidate evaluations: Warmth is more im-
portant than competence, leadership, and integrity. Electoral Studies, 49, 96–107.
Lee, F. L. (2015). How citizens react to political scandals surrounding government leaders: A survey study in Hong Kong. 
Asian Journal of Political Science, 23, 44–62.
Lodge, M., & Taber, C. (2013). The rationalizing voter. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Maier, J. (2011). The impact of political scandals on political support: An experimental test of two theories. International 
Political Science Review, 32, 283–302.
Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M. (2000). Affective intelligence and political judgment. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press.
Mason, L. (2018). Uncivil agreement: How politics became our identity. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Mokken, R. J. (1971). A theory and procedure of scale analysis. The Hague: Mouton.
Montgomery, J. M., Nyhan, B., & Torres, M. (2018). How conditioning on posttreatment variables can ruin your experiment 
and what to do about it. American Journal of Political Science, 62(3), 760–775.
Peterson, D. A. M., & Vonnahme, B. M. (2014). Aww ducky shucky: Voter response to Accusations of Herman Cain’s inap-
propriate behavior. PS: Perspectives on Politics, 47, 372–378.
Redlawsk, D. P. (2002). Hot cognition or cool consideration? Testing the effects of motivated reasoning on political decision 
making. Journal of Politics, 64(4), 1021–1044.
Redlawsk, D. P. (2006). Feeling politics: Emotion in political information processing. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018). The theory of dyadic morality: Reinventing moral judgment by redefining moral harm. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 22, 32–70.
Schreiber, D., Fonzo, G., Simmons, A. N., Dawes, C. T., Flagan, T., Fowler, J. H., & Paulus, M. P. (2013). Red brain, blue 
brain: Evaluative processes differ in Democrats and Republicans. PLoS One, 8, e52970.
Shah, D. V., Watts, M. D., Domke, D., & Fan, D. P. (2002). News framing and cueing of issue regimes: Explaining Clinton’s 
public approval in spite of scandal. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 66, 339–370.
Smith, K. B., Alford, J. R., Hibbing, J. R., Martin, N. G., & Hatemi, P. K. (2017). Intuitive ethics and political orientations: 
Testing moral foundation as a theory of political ideology. American Journal of Political Science, 61, 424–437.
Taber, C., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated scepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. American Journal of Political 
Science, 50, 755–769.
Tiedens, L. Z. (2001). Anger and advancement versus sadness and subjugation: The effect of negative emotion expressions on 
social status conferral. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 86–94.
Thompson, J. B. (2013). Political scandal: Power and visibility in the media age. Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell.
23Voters’ Partisan Responses to Politicians’ Immoral Behavior
Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publish-
er’s web site:
Appendix S1. Full Models
Table S1.1. Voters’ Emotional Responses to Politicians’ Moral Transgressions for Different Moral 
Foundations
Table S1.2. Voters’ Emotional Responses to Politicians’ Moral Transgressions by Partisanship
Table S1.3. Full Interaction Models Partisan Vignettes Foundation Care
Table S1.4. Full Interaction Models Partisan Vignettes Foundation Fairness
Table S1.5. Full Interaction Models Partisan Vignettes Foundation Loyalty
Table S1.6. Full Interaction Models Partisan Vignettes Foundation Authority
Table S1.7. Full Interaction Models Partisan Vignettes Foundation Sanctity
Table S1.8. Full Interaction Models Nonpartisan Vignettes Per Foundation
General notes for Tables A1.3 through A1.7
Appendix S2. Study Details
Table S2.1. Treatment Groups Vignette Study
Table S2.2. Voters’ Moral Judgment of Moral Violations in %
Table S2.3. Sample Demographics
Table S2.4. Randomization Checks
Table S2.5. Correlations Between Emotions
Table S2.6. Negative Affect Scale
Table S2.7. Positive Affect Scale
Appendix S3. Stimulus Material
Appendix S4. Selection of Vignettes and Pre-test
Table S4.1. MTurk Sample Demographics
Table S4.2. Voters’ Judgments of Politicians Moral Violations in %
Table S4.3. Scalability Scenarios
Appendix 5. Questionnaire
